Abstract-Lossy identification schemes derive tightly secure signature schemes via the Fiat-Shamir transformation. There exist several instantiations of lossy identification schemes by using several cryptographic assumptions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fiat-Shamir transformation [7] is a general method to construct secure and efficient signature schemes from three-move identification schemes. There exist many signature schemes constructed by using this method [11] , [19] , [17] , [13] , [8] , [9] , [14] , [15] . For the security of signatures derived by the Fiat-Shamir transformation, Abdalla, An, Bellare and C. Namprempre [1] showed that the signature scheme that is constructed by this method is existentially unforgeable against the chosen message attack in the random oracle model [5] if and only if the underlying identification scheme is secure against the passive impersonation attack. Moreover, they also showed that the security reduction of such signature schemes is loose. Namely the success probability of the reduction looses the polynomial factor. This meas that one must choose large security parameter in order to ensure the security in practical.
In order to solve the problem above, Abdalla, Fouque, Lyubaschevsky and Tibouchi [3] introduced the notion of the lossy identification schemes. Lossy identification schemes can be transformed into signature schemes which have tight security reduction by the Fiat-Shamir transformation. They proposed some instantiations of lossy identification schemes based on the short discrete logarithm assumption, the ring-LWE assumption and the subset sum assumption, respectively. Following their work, Abdalla, Ben Hamouda and Pointcheval constructed lossy identification schemes from the several integer factoring-based cryptographic assumptions, such as the φ-hiding assumption [6] , the QR assumption, the RSA assumption and the DCR assumption [18] . Hasegawa and Isobe [12] proposed the lossy identification scheme by using the subgroup decision assumption [4] . They also proposed another lossy identification scheme based on the DCR assumption by applying the construction of the subgroup decision-based scheme.
In this paper, we propose a new instantiation of lossy identification schemes. Our scheme is constructed based on the decisional RSA assumption which is introduced by Groth [10] , for semi-smooth numbers. A semi-smooth number N is a composites of the form N = P Q such that P = 2pp + 1 and Q = 2qq + 1, where p and q are primes, and p and q are the product of suitably small distinct primes. In the case of semi-smooth numbers, the set QR N of quadratic residues modulo N can be decomposed as QR N = G 1 × G 2 where G 1 and G 2 are the unique subgroups of order p q and pq, respectively. The decisional RSA assumption intuitively says that a uniformly random element from QR N is computationally indistinguishable to the one from the subgroup G 1 .
Employing the decisional RSA assumption for semismooth numbers, Groth [10] constructed the homomorphic public key encryption. Mei, Li, Lu and Jia [16] proposed the chosen ciphertext secure public key encryption from the integer factoring assumption with respect to semi-smooth numbers.
Our lossy identification scheme based on the decisional RSA assumption has efficient response algorithm as well as the DCR-based scheme by [12] . This is because our scheme needs no modular exponentiation in its response algorithm. Moreover, the size of public keys of ID DRSA is smaller than ID DCR , and as same as integer factoring-based schemes by [2] . These facts means that our scheme is one of the most efficient scheme among lossy identification schemes based on integer factoring-based assumptions.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we describe definitions and notions which are used in this paper. The descriptions follow in the literature [3] , [12] Let N and Z be the set of natural numbers and the ring of rational integers, respectively. For any N ∈ N, let Z N be the residue ring Z/N Z, and let Z × N denote the multiplicative group of units in Z N . We say that a prime P is safe if P = 2p + 1 for some prime p. For a finite set A, |A| denotes the number of elements in A. Let G be a group. For an element g ∈ G, g denotes the cyclic subgroup generated by g. Throughout the paper, we denote by λ ∈ N the security parameter. A function (λ) is said to be negligible if for any polynomial p, there exists a constant λ 0 ∈ N such that (λ) < 1/p(λ) for any λ ≥ λ 0 .
We write a $ ← − A to denote sampling an element a uniformly at random from the set A. Let A be a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) Turing machine. We write y $ ← − A(x) to denote that A outputs y on its execution for the input x. y is distributed according to the internal randomness of A. For any PPT machine A, we define the advantage
A. Lossy Identification Schemes
A lossy identification scheme is a three-move protocol between two PPT machines, called the prover and the verifier. A lossy identification scheme has two key generation algorithms. The one is the normal key generation algorithm KG, which outputs a pair of a public key and a secret key on the input security parameter. Another is the lossy key generation algorithm LKG. When a public key is generated by LKG, it has no corresponding secret key. Moreover, when a prover uses a lossy key, he cannot convince the verifier with non-negligible probability.
Definition 1 (Lossy Identification Schemes [3]). A lossy identification scheme ID is defined by a tuple
• KG is the normal key generation algorithm which takes a security parameter 1 λ as the input and outputs a pair (pk, sk) of a public key pk and a secret key sk.
• LKG is the lossy key generation algorithm which takes a security parameter 1 λ as the input and output a lossy public key pk.
• Comm is the prover algorithm which takes sk as the input and outputs a commitment string cmt and a state string st.
• S is the space from which the verifier chooses a challenge string ch. The length of the challenge ch is determined by λ.
• Resp is the prover algorithm which takes a tuple (sk, cmt, ch, st) as the input and outputs a response string rsp.
• Ver is the deterministic algorithm which takes a tuple (pk, cmt, ch, rsp) as the input and outputs 1 or 0 to indicate accept or reject, respectively.
The protocol of ID is depicted in Figure 1 .
We say that a public key pk is normal when it is generated by KG. Otherwise when pk is generated by LKG, we say that it is lossy. Note that a single key pk can be generated by both KG and LKG in general.
Following [1] , [3] , we associate to ID, λ and each (pk, sk) a randomized transcript generation oracle Tr ID pk,sk,λ outputs a random transcript (cmt, ch, rsp) of an "honest" execution of the protocol on no inputs. The description of Tr ID pk,sk,λ is given as follows:
lossy if it satisfies the following conditions.
• ρ-completeness: For every security parameter λ and every pair of normal keys (pk, sk)
• ε S -simulatability: For every security parameter λ and every pair of normal keys (pk, sk) From a lossy identification scheme, we can obtain a signature scheme which is existentially unforgeable against the chosen message attack in the random oracle model by applying the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, as shown in the following theorem [3] . 
where negl(λ) denotes some negligible function in the security parameter λ. The resulting signature scheme outputs a valid signature with overwhelming probability.
We assume that for all schemes considered in this paper, their commitment spaces have sufficiently high entropy.
B. Decisional RSA assumption
We use four natural numbers p, q, p and q . They are mutually coprime, p and q are large primes, and p and q are square-free odd numbers. We call N = P Q, where P = 2pp + 1 and Q = 2qq + 1, a semi-smooth number. Note that the semi-smoothness usually requires that p and q are product of several distinct odd primes that smaller than some specified bound B. However, in this paper we do not require this condition. Instead, we require that they are moderately large so that 1/pq is negligible.
For a semi-smooth number N , QR N denotes the set of quadratic residues modulo N . Then QR N is a cyclic group of order pqp q . QR N has unique subgroups G 1 of order p q and G 2 of order pq, respectively. By the definition of the semi-smooth number, p, q, p and q are relatively coprime. Therefore, it follows that QR N can be decomposed as a direct product
The decisional RSA assumption in [10] is defined over Z × N of RSA composite order. In this paper, we restrict ourselves to the case where N is a semi-smooth number. The formal definition is as follows.
We first define a group generator G DRSA . G DRSA takes a security parameter 1 λ as the input and outputs a tuple (p, q, p , q ) such that N = P Q is a semi-smooth number with P = 2pp +1 and Q = 2qq +1. Note that we require that all bit length of each p, q, p , q are almost the same. This requirement is needed so that both 1/pq and 1/p q are negligible in λ.
Definition 3 (decisional RSA assumption). Let families of distributions {X
We say that the ε-decisional RSA assumption holds for G DRSA if {X DRSA,λ } and {Y DRSA,λ } are computationally ε-close.
III. LOSSY IDENTIFICATION SCHEMES BASED ON THE DECISIONAL RSA ASSUMPTION
We propose a new lossy identification scheme based on the decisional RSA assumption. For the purpose, we require new families of distributions {X DRSA,λ } and {Ỹ DRSA,λ } such that the indistinguishability between them is derived the decisional RSA assumption.
X DRSA,λ is defined bỹ
where G 1 is the set of all generators of G 1 .Ỹ DRSA,λ is defined byỸ
Note that a generator of G 1 can be uniformly sampled efficiently with overwhelming probability [10] . Namely, we can obtain a uniformly random element of G 1 . The decisional RSA assumption implies the indistinguishability betweenX DRSA,λ andỸ DRSA,λ as shown in the following lemma. Lemma 1 is proven in a similar way to Proposition 1 of [12] . The proof will be appeared in the full paper.
We now construct a lossy identification scheme ID DRSA = (KG, LKG, Comm, S, Resp, Ver) as follows. Comm and Ver are performed over the group Z × N . On the other hand, Resp is performed over the ring Z φ(N ) , where φ denotes Euler's phi function.
• KG takes a security parameter 1 λ as the input. KG
, and chooses a Prover Verifier Input:
Input: sk = ((p, q, p , q ), g, a) pk = (N, g, y) . KG sets N = (2pp + 1)(2qq + 1) and y = g a , and outputs pk = (N, g, y) and sk = ((p, q, p , q ), g, a) .
• LKG takes a security parameter 1 λ as the input. LKG
, and chooses a generator g
, and outputs pk = (N, g, y) .
• Comm takes a tuple ((p, q, p , q ), g) as the input.
Comm picks a random string r $ ← − Z φ(N ) and sets A = g r . Comm outputs the commitment string cmt = A and the state string st = r.
• The space S of the verifier's challenges is Z N . The challenge string ch is w
• Resp takes a tuple (a, w, r) as the input and computes s = aw + r mod φ(N ). Resp outputs the response string rsp = s.
• Ver takes a tuple ( (N, g, y) , A, w, s) as the input and outputs 1 if Ay w = g s holds, or outputs 0 if otherwise.
The protocol ID DRSA is depicted in Figure 2 .
We evaluate the parameters (ρ, ε S , ε K , ε L ) described in Definition 2 for ID DRSA . We use the following lemmas. The proofs will be given in the full paper.
Lemma 2.
There exist negligible functions δ 1 , δ 2 and δ 3 such that for any (p, q, p , q ) generated by G DRSA , (N − φ(N ))/N < δ 1 (λ), (pq − φ(pq))/pq < δ 2 (λ) and 1/pq + 1/N < δ 3 (λ) for any λ, where N = (2pp + 1)(2qq + 1).
Lemma 3.
For any natural number n, let U n denote the uniform distribution over Z n , U n denote the uniform distribution over Z n \ {0}, and let U pk,λ (). We note that s is regarded as a random variable over Z N , although s is distributed over Z φ(N ) in the genuine transcript.
We show that Δ ≤ 2δ 1 . We denote by Δ A the statistical distance between the distribution of A in the genuine transcript and the one in the simulated transcript. Δ w and Δ s are similarily defined, respectively. Then we have Δ ≤ Δ A + Δ w + Δ s by the triangle inequality. Since w is uniformly distributed over Z N in both of the genuine and simulated transcripts, we have Δ w = 0. We can easily observe that s is uniformly distributed over Z φ (N ) and Z N in the genuine and simulated transcripts, respectively. Then, Lemma 3(i) implies that Δ s = Δ(U φ(N ) , U N ) < δ 1 . We next evaluate Δ A . In the genuine transcript, A is uniformly distributed over the subgroup G 1 . Consider the distribution of A in the simulated transcript. We have (ε + δ 2 )-key indistinguishability: The distribution of public keys generated by KG(1 λ ) andX DRSA,λ are identical by their definitions. On the other hand, the distribution of public keys generated by LKG(1 λ ) andỸ DRSA,λ are δ 2 -close by Lemma 3(ii). Combining these facts with Lemma 1, The statistical distance between the distribution of the normal keys generated by KG and the lossy keys generated by LKG is less than (ε + δ 2 ). This implies (ε + δ 2 )-key indistinguishability. δ 3 -lossiness: Let A be any passive impersonation adversary, and let Succ A (λ) denote the event that the experiment Exp
Let pk = (N, g, y) be any lossy public key generated by LKG on the input
We evaluate the probability Pr[Succ A ] that the event Succ A occurs by estimating the number of the verifier's challenges for which A can produce a correct response. Since f = G 2 , f is of order |G 2 | = pq. If the verifier's challenge w ∈ Z N is a multiple of pq, then we have f w = 1 and hence y w = g aw f bw = g aw ∈ G 1 . Namely, if the challenge w is a multiple of pq, the lossy key pk acts as normal keys. This means that there exists such a "bad" challenge w in Z N with the period pq. We show that there exist overwhelmingly many challenge strings in Z pq such that A cannot produce a correct response for the challenge, even if A is computationally unbounded and A can arbitrarily determine his commitment string. We use the following lemma. The proof will be given in the full paper. 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have proposed a new construction of lossy identification scheme based on the decisional RSA assumption. Our decisional RSA-based scheme ID DRSA has the efficient response algorithm Resp as well as the DCR-based scheme ID DCR in [12] , because Resp executes one modular addition and one modular multiplication but no modular exponentiation. Note that other lossy identification schemes based on integer factoring-based assumptions in [2] need modular exponentiation in their response algorithms. Moreover, the size of public keys of ID DRSA is smaller than ID DCR , and as same as integer factoring-based schemes by [2] . This is because ID DRSA runs over the group Z × N while ID DCR runs over the group Z × N 2 . These facts means that ID DRSA is one of the most efficient scheme among lossy identification schemes based on integer factoring-based assumptions.
